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The Growth of Mass and Reliability Source Database and Me 
Mass and Reliability Source (MaRS) is a database which draws together information 
from multiple other sources and databases (MADS, VMDB, ISS PART, Bayesian PowerPoint, 
etc.). Information such as mass, operating hours, and failure data are compiled to create a tool 
for the building of probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) models. MaRS also has great potential 
for deep space mission planning. Understanding the lowest point of failure within an ORU helps 
to inform the efficient selection of spare parts necessary for a journey where mass and volume 
are at a premium and resupply is not possible. 
Most of the real database building work has been completed by previous interns. The 
main bulk of the work I did revolved around documenting failure data. Problem Reporting and 
Corrective Action (PRACA) and In Flight Investigation (IFI) reports were investigated for specific 
failure events. These reports are listed in MaRS and can be accessed through the ISS PART 
database. The goal is to understand what occurred and how so that the lowest part that failed 
can be identified. Once identified, its part number and MaRS database location can be 
documented.  
This process of failure point identification was really very different case to case. In the 
best case scenario, the problem was well understood and the PRACA report clearly stated the 
culprit part and its related part number. This was rare, however. Most reports are incomplete 
or poorly written, making the process more investigative in nature. The cause of failure may be 
buried in a paragraph or, in some cases, one report will refer you to another which will refer 
you to another which might have some useful information. At times it is also necessary to 
consult technical drawings of components in order to solve the puzzle or locate a part number. 
Each failure, once identified, was categorized as one of four types; random, induced, wear-out, 
or other.  
 While working with MaRS, my teammate and I realized that there were a great many 
fields left blank. We felt that if someone were to search for a specific component in MaRS, it 
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may not be clear whether or not the missing information exists in the source databases and 
simply was not recorded. That may lead the inquirer to spend time searching for that 
information only to find that it does not, in fact, exist in the source databases for MaRS. We 
have seen this in the MADS database where many fields are left blank leaving a rather 
ambiguous report. To resolve this issue, we checked source databases for the missing 
information and either added anything that was missing or annotated that the information 
does not in fact exist. Figure 1 illustrates the word “None” being added to show that there are 
no relevant failure reports for the applicable parts. These fields were previously blank. 
 
Figure 1 A sample of the MaRS database showing the word “None” being used to remove 
ambiguity. 
 MaRS is meant to be used as a tool for PRA model development. In order for this to 
work, bounds must be placed on the data set. It was discovered that many of the PRACA and IFI 
reports listed in MaRS fell outside of those bounds that had been previously set. Many reports 
described events that occurred after the 1/1/2012 cutoff date. Many described failures or other 
issues that arose with equipment that were not currently on orbit i.e. during manufacturing and 
ground testing. There were also several reports filed in response to missed scheduled 
preventative maintenance and other events that do not constitute a failure. Each report was 
assessed for these issues and, if found to fall outside the bounds placed on the MaRS dataset, 
was removed from the database.  
 Andrew and I took on a side project in support of the Bureau of Safety and 
Environmental Enforcement. This was a fantastic bonus education regarding topics that I really 
hadn’t thought about before. We reviewed Applications for Permission to Drill (API’s) for deep-
water oil exploration and extracted information about the depth of geological features beneath 
the sea floor, the structure of the proposed well, and other key information. The data was used 
to populate a new database that will be used to build PRA models to help estimate the risk of 
future drilling accidents. A set of 115 graphs was developed from data sets from previously 
drilled deep-water wells. Figure 2 is an example of such a graph. The idea was to look for 
correlations in the data with a primary focus on what matters as far as the time it takes to 
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complete a well. Longer drill times can result in an increased risk of severe weather exposure 
for the drill rig and an increased probability of an accident occurring. 
Figure 2 An example of a graph showing the time it takes to drill a well vs the depth of the well 
from the ocean floor. 
 This internship was an intense educational experience for me. I absolutely loved working 
with Safety and Mission Assurance. I feel like I really acquired some of that safety flavor that I 
can apply to anything I do in the future. For me, it was really about the wisdom to take a step 
back and asses what I am doing to make sure that the task is being completed in the best and 
safest way possible. This is an invaluable notion that will be brought with me no matter what I 
do. My experience at Johnson Space Center was much different from my previous tour at 
Stennis Space Center. JSC has a much more developed intern program with lectures happening 
almost twice a week. Adding in regular employee lectures and tours listed on Roundup, I was 
able to take advantage of an educational opportunity almost daily. I learned about space craft, 
deep-water oil exploration, NASA history and culture, anthropometrics and spacesuit design, 
small body orbital mechanics… The list goes on. These are gems that I can’t wait to take with 
me and share with fellow students and anyone with the patience to listen to me go on about it. 
One of my favorite lessons this summer was taught by astronaut Victor Glover. He said to aspire 
to be strong… like water. Water can adapt and fit into any form it encounters, but is 
incompressible. You cannot compromise its volumetric integrity. 
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